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ABSTRACT 
Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1993 following the Oslo 
Accords, Israel supposedly handed its duties of safeguarding the economic and social 
interests of the West Bank’s Palestinian population to the Palestinian Authority. In 
doing so, it allegedly followed a separation strategy and granted the Palestinian 
people the right to self-determination by allowing them to govern themselves. This 
essay uses Foucault’s ideas on power and governmentality to investigate whether 
Israel has truly ceased governing the Palestinian population and whether the PA is 
properly equipped to serve as a state apparatus. The essay’s central thesis is that, 
despite the separation, Israel employs bio-political technologies that both regulate 
Palestinian life and incapacitate the PA from fulfilling its regulatory duties towards 
Palestinians. In making that argument, the essay introduces a brief explication of 
Foucault’s modes of power before analysing, through Foucauldian lens, three primary 
ways through which the state of Israel intervenes in Palestinian life today. It looks at 
the erection of checkpoints, the building and maintenance of settlements, and the 
usage of laws, administrative policies and economic policies. The concept of 
‘dispowerment’ is introduced as a neologism to describe a state apparatus’s situation 
when the conditions for the possibility of its acting as a bio-power apparatus are made 
absent. For a state to be fully dispowered, it must have had its bio-political 
technologies rendered ineffective rendering the state an impotent bio-power 
apparatus. The investigation finds that Israel continues to regulate Palestinian life in 
the West Bank and that the structure of the occupation dispowers the PA. In other 
words, under the current structure of the occupation, neither Israel separated nor the 
PA regulated. 
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I.  Introduction: 
The West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS) has faced a series of developments since the 
creation of the State of Israel in 1948. These political developments have played a 
major role in the political and economic status of the WBGS. The 1967 Occupation of 
the Palestinian Territories managed to intertwine the Palestinian and Israeli economies 
creating a co-dependency that was and is asymmetrical.1 From the beginning, Israel 
held the upper hand in this asymmetrical relationship by virtue of its superior 
diversity and size of its economy and the rarity of imposed trade restrictions on 
Palestine. The WBGS holds the weaker position in this relationship, having their 
economy isolated by trade restrictions and having the country’s already poor 
infrastructure damaged by war.  
 The 1967 occupation has resulted in the economic downfall of the West Bank. 
All matters relating to administrative control was in the hands of the Israeli military 
government known as the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), which stated that, the already 
existing law of the West Bank would remain in force, in so far as it does not stand in 
conflict with any military decree or amendment; each decree or amendment took 
preference over any local law.2 The IDF also asserted that powers related to 
government, legislation and appointment would be decided upon and exercised by the 
IDF exclusively, leaving the local law in the West Bank, which was Jordanian law, in 
effect unless amended or replaced.3  
 Israel had a duty under article 43 of The Hague Regulations, which stated that, 
the occupying power “shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, 
as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely 
prevented, the laws in force in the country,” 
This included the military government’s protection of the economic and social 
interests of the population.4 However, with the increasing number of military 
enactments, the substance of the enactments extended to govern non-military affairs. 
Since 1967, around 2500 enactments have been issued in areas of “military, judiciary, 
and fiscal affairs, through welfare, health and education, to import duties, postal laws 
and the transportation of agricultural products”.5 
 The Oslo Accords that came in the early 1990s are a set of agreements 
between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). 
Oslo I, which is formally known as the Declaration of Principles (DOP) had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  LEILA	  FARSAKH,	  PALESTINIAN	  LABOUR	  MIGRATION	  TO	  ISRAEL	  31	  (2005).	  
2	  Amir	  Paz-­‐Fuchs	  &	  Yael	  Ronen,	  Occupational	  Hazards:	  Labor	  Law	  in	  the	  Occupied	  Territories,	  
INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  FORUM	  OF	  THE	  HEBREW	  UNIVERSITY	  OF	  JERUSALEM,	  7	  (2011).	  
3	  Id.	  at	  8.	  
4	  Id.	  at	  8.	  
5	  Id.	  at	  9.	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introduced a timetable of the peace process for the Middle East.6 The declaration 
proposed an interim Palestinian government. The meetings of the agreement were 
conveyed throughout several months in the years 1992 and 1993 in complete secrecy. 
Oslo II, officially known as the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the WBGS, 
was a further expansion on the first agreement. Its provisions elaborated on the 
withdrawal of the Israeli troops from six cities in the West Bank and some 450 
towns.7 The agreement also came to a timetable for the Palestinian Legislative 
Council. After several meetings between Israeli and Palestinian officials across a span 
of a couple of months, in August 1993, the PLO signed the agreement with the Israeli 
Foreign Ministry Director.8 In September 1993, the PLO confirmed its recognition of 
the right of Israel to exist and Israel affirmed its recognition of the PLO as the one 
entity representing the Palestinian people. The second signing of the Oslo Accords 
took place in September 1995, however, Israeli and Palestinian officials failed to 
reach a final peace agreement.9 After the riots and the suicide bombings that took 
place in September 2000, the peace process was put to an end. The Oslo Accords 
mainly called for the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho and the West Bank, 
five years of “limited autonomy” for Palestinians in the abovementioned territories, 
elections of Palestinian Legislative Council on the span of nine months, and the 
establishment of a Palestinian police force. As a result of the Oslo Agreements, the 
transition of the PLO into a self-governing body created an interim government, the 
Palestinian National Authority (PA).10   
The PA currently continues to officially represent the Palestinian people, in 
maintaining its objective to the right of self-determination. The PA has been given the 
authority and responsibility to govern the Occupied Territories, which have been 
divided as per the Oslo Agreements; area A is under the PA’s full civil and security 
control (comprises 3 percent of the WB), area B is under the PA’s civil control and 
joint Israeli-Palestinian security control (comprises 23-25 percent of the WB), and 
area C is under full Israeli civil and security control (comprises 72-74 percent of the 
WB).11 Other key agreements include the Economic Protocol, regulating the 
economic relationship between Israel and the PA. 
The central thesis of this essay is to argue that Israel continues to regulate 
Palestinian life in the West Bank despite the separation strategy that they agreed upon 
in the Oslo Accords. The essay also argues that the structure of the Israeli occupation 
incapacitates the PA as a state apparatus. To state this second point in other words, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  CNN	  Library,	  OSLO	  ACCORDS	  FAST	  FACTS	  CNN	  (2013),	  
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/03/world/meast/oslo-­‐accords-­‐fast-­‐facts/.	  
7	  Id.	  
8	  Id.	  
9	  Id.	  
10	  Id.	  
11	  Joel	  Beinin,	  The	  Demise	  of	  the	  Oslo	  Process,	  MIDDLE	  EAST	  PRESS,	  1999,	  
http://web.archive.org/web/20000816222849/http://www.merip.org/pins/pin1.html.	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conditions, which make the PA’s governing possible, are being made absent by 
Israel’s interventions in Palestinian affairs thereby diminishing if not eliminating the 
possibility of the PA performing its governing operations. Israeli interventions in the 
West Bank will thus be argued to present structural constraints on the PA’s governing 
potential. 
In making both these arguments, this essay will utilize Foucault’s ideas on 
power and governmentality to analyze the main instruments of Israeli interventions in 
Palestinian affairs as a sample representing the structure of the occupation. The essay 
will analyze the erection of checkpoints, the building and maintaining of settlements 
before finally analyzing multiple Israeli laws and policies.     
This essay will use a Foucauldian framework because his ideas on power 
present a comprehensive matrix of analysis that is suitable for the Israeli Occupation 
of Palestine. First, his ideas are based studying various modes of governmentalities 
across different times in western history and tracing the development of each mode. 
This makes his ideas relevant to the Israeli occupation of Palestine since the former is 
a recently founded modern state apparatus while the latter is an emerging state 
apparatus particularly since 1993. Foucault’s insights on how modern governments 
function presents an analytical tool that can be used to explicate the conditions that a 
state apparatus must have satisfied for the possibility of its effective governing. 
Conclusions on the PA’s potency or impotence given the occupation’s structure can 
then be drawn based on whether these conditions were found present or absent. 
Second, Foucault’s thoughts on the working mechanisms of disciplinary 
power and bio-power provide an analytical tool for illuminating how settlements, for 
example, can serve a regulatory function beyond its obvious housing function. The 
Israeli occupation employs multiple security apparatuses in the West Bank but the 
regulatory or incapacitating effects of having these apparatuses installed would not be 
appreciated without the kind of insights that a Foucauldian analytical framework 
would provide. After all, most analyses performed on the West Bank’s occupation by 
Israel are done within the juridico-legal framework, which is largely blind to how 
surveillance and population control works.  
Finally, in a case where the occupying party has supposedly granted the 
occupied party the right to self-determination, the use of a Foucault’s thoughts on bio-
power would reveal whether that right to self-determination has really been granted 
and is actually being performed or is just political rhetoric. An investigation that uses 
Foucault’s bio-power as one of its analytical tools reveals whether or not Israel is still 
regulating the West Bank’s population and aids the detection of structural constraints 
to the PA’s governing potential.  
At this stage of the essay, the appropriateness of using Foucault as the selected 
analytical lens will be under-appreciated by readers who are not acquainted with 
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Foucault’s thought. For this reason, the subsequent few sections of the essay will 
explicate Foucault’s ideas on power and governmentality in developing the theoretical 
framework of the essay.                 
Before explicating Foucault, however, it is worth noting that this essay is by 
no means an apology for the PA’s poor performance but rather aims to shed light on 
the regulatory activities that Israel still employs as well as on the structural constraints 
on the PA’s space for governance rather than on the particular political manoeuvres, 
strategies or policies that were, are, or can potentially be employed by any particular 
individual or faction within the PA.  
The PA officials’ competence, integrity and commitment to the Palestinian 
cause as individuals have been under heavy scrutiny and criticism since 1993. 
Multiple PA officials, including senior level, have been accused and on some 
occasions tried and convicted of corruption charges including but not limited to 
embezzlement, misappropriation of funds, smuggling, money-laundering, fraud, abuse 
of trust and abuse of official positions for personal gains. A report prepared by the 
European Union asserted that financial corruption in the PA has led to the dubious 
“loss” of EU foreign aid amounting to an estimate of two billion Euros between the 
years 2008 and 2010.12 Further, a report published by the World Bank in 2003 noted 
that the late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat had an estimated 900 million dollars 
out of the PA’s budget transferred to an “unknown party” between 1995 and 2000.13 
Arafat’s wife, Suha Al Tawil was under investigation by French courts for having 
nine million euros deposited in her name in two Paris based accounts.14 
The aforementioned cases are merely a small sample of many cases of 
corruption in the PA that are thoroughly documented in Ramahi’s report Corruption 
in the Palestinian Authority. Criticisms of incompetence too are well documented 
with multiple books and reports identifying what the PA did or is doing wrong and 
giving recommendations on how to improve its performance. An independent task 
force report published and sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations is one 
example amongst many works that critiqued the PA’s performance and choice of 
strategies. Moreover, Shehadeh’s From Occupation to Interim Accords: Israel and the 
Palestinian territories analyses the context in which the Oslo Accords negotiations 
took place and blames the PLO negotiators’ failure to understand Israel’s real aims of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  SAWSAN	  RAMAHI,	  CORRUPTION	  IN	  THE	  PALESTINIAN	  AUTHORITY	  4–15	  4	  (2013),	  
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/downloads/reports/20131214_Corruptioninth
ePalestinianAuthority.pdf	  (last	  visited	  May	  18,	  2014).	  
13	  Id.	  at	  4–5.	  
14	  Id.	  at	  5.	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consolidating the occupation, for the damaging concessions and losses that 
Palestinians incurred from the process.15 
Such strong performance criticisms and corruption documentation at both the 
individual and institutional levels indicate two possibilities with regards to the PA’s 
relationship with Israel. The first possibility is that the PA is an independent emerging 
state apparatus, born out of resistance to the occupation, but has fallen under Israeli 
control one way or another and is largely serving Israeli interests. The second 
possibility is that the PA continues to serve Palestinian interests as an institution since 
its founding but is ridden with incompetence and corruption. This essay’s second 
argument, pertaining to the structural constraints that the occupation maintains over 
the PA’s governance potential, avoids the problematic of having to assume either 
position. The nature of the argument circumvents this problem since the argument 
seeks to prove that the structure of the occupation incapacitates the PA’s governing 
ability as an institution rather than as a sum of individuals. In other words, the 
structuralist nature of the argument renders the integrity, competence and 
commitment of the PA’s individual personnel irrelevant. If, hypothetically speaking, 
the PA’s personnel were to be substituted by more committed and more competent 
individuals, the same structural constraints and power relationships will persist is the 
claim of the argument.             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  RAJA	  SHEHADEH,	  FROM	  OCCUPATION	  TO	  INTERIM	  ACCORDS:	  ISRAEL	  AND	  THE	  PALESTINIAN	  
TERRITORIES	  XIII	  (1997).	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II. Theoretical Framework: 
The following few sections will briefly explore and explicate Foucault’s modes of 
power that will serve as the analytical lens of this essay. 
A. Foucault on power: 
Foucault does not really provide an explicit theory of power in his works but rather 
gives an analysis of power in many of his books, primarily in Discipline and Punish, 
The History of Sexuality as well as in many of his lectures across his career. In his 
analyses of power, Foucault traces the origins and developments of multiple forms or 
rather “modes” of power that still permeate in modern liberal democracies. He gives a 
genealogy of power and traces its evolution across various times and illuminates how 
the purposes, functions and technologies of power have developed over time.  
If we are to have a Foucauldian theoretical framework of power, it thus must 
be an abstraction of the various modes of power and their particular features from 
Foucault’s genealogy. But first, it must be noted that Foucault’s usage of the term 
power is quite different from its common usage and so for the sake of clarity, a brief 
explanation of how Foucault defines power must be presented before discussing the 
various modes of power in his works. 
The common usage of the term power usually takes power to be some sort of 
force wielded by institutions, states, or individuals against other entities to ensure 
their subjugation, dominion or annihilation. Foucault attributes such definitions of 
power to mistaking a contingent accidental feature of power for an essential 
characteristic of it. He warns his readers against such misunderstanding: 
The word power is apt to lead to a number of misunderstandings- 
misunderstandings with respect to its nature, its form and its unity. By power, 
I do not mean power as a group of mechanisms or institutions that ensure the 
subservience of the citizens of a given state. By power I do not mean either, a 
mode of subjugation, which in contrast to violence has the form of the rule. 
Finally, I do not have in mind a general system of domination exerted by one 
group over another.16  
What Foucault does mean by power is quite different. Foucault understands power to 
be a multiplicity of force relations of an omnipresent nature, meaning that it exists 
everywhere where there is interaction. It can be positive and productive or negative 
and existing between egalitarian as well as ordered social interactions.17 It is 
manifested on micro and macro levels. It is very pervasive in most forms, which make 
its definition quite vague. In Foucault’s own words: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  MICHEL	  FOUCAULT,	  THE	  HISTORY	  OF	  SEXUALITY	  VOLUME	  1:	  AN	  INTRODUCTION	  92	  (Robert	  Hurley	  
tran.,	  1978).	  
17	  MICHEL	  FOUCAULT,	  POWER/KNOWLEDGE:	  SELECTED	  INTERVIEWS	  AND	  OTHER	  WRITINGS,	  1972-­‐1977	  
134	  (Colin	  Gordon	  ed.,,	  John	  Mepham	  &	  Kate	  Soper	  trans.,	  1980).	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It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the 
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate 
and which constitute their own organization; [secondly,] as the process which, 
through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens or 
reverses them; [thirdly,] as the support in which these force relations find in 
one another, thus forming a chain or a system or on the contrary, the 
disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and 
lastly [fourthly,] as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general 
design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the 
formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.18     
Power for Foucault, thus has four fundamental aspects that define it: 
1. It is a multiplicity of force relations of various qualities;19 
2. It is the process by which these force relations are strengthened or weakened 
or transformed;20  
3. It is how these force relations manifest themselves in terms of organization;21 
4. It is the force relation’s manifestation in institutions as well as in social 
interactions.22  
It is important to note here that power is not binary and is not reduced to a 
sovereign agent but is rather seen as complex, permeating and interacting forces that 
may or may not overlap and may or may not organize into a system. Despite this 
discussion, the definition of power remains very difficult to comprehend; it will 
become clearer, however, when Foucault’s modes of power are explicated from his 
genealogy in the following brief discussion of it. 
B. Foucault’s modes of power: 
Foucault’s analysis observed three different modalities of power. These modes are not 
mutually exclusive and often times overlap but each has its own distinctions. The 
modes of power that are of relevance to the purposes of this thesis are classified as 
sovereign power, disciplinary power and bio-power all of which will be illuminated in 
the next three sections of this essay where the genealogy will be briefly discussed and 
the characteristics of each power module will then be summarized. 
1. Sovereign power: 
Foucault’s genealogy begins with an analysis of power in the Middle-Ages. Foucault 
observed that societies in the Middle-Ages were largely ruled by the juridical model 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  FOUCAULT,	  supra	  note___	  at	  92–93.	  
19	  Richard	  Lynch,	  Foucault’s	  theory	  of	  power,	  in	  MICHEL	  FOUCAULT	  KEY	  CONCEPTS	  13–26,	  19	  
(Dianna	  Taylor	  ed.,	  2011).	  
20	  Id.	  at	  19.	  
21	  Id.	  at	  19.	  
22	  Id.	  at	  19.	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of power or what he calls sovereign power. Sovereign power pre-dates the rest of the 
modes of power that Foucault observed. Under this model the sovereign has “the right 
to take life or let live”23 by virtue of the relationship between the sovereign and his 
subjects. The sovereign holds a monopoly of violence over a particular territory and 
its inhabitants. He has the right to kill any subject who transgresses against the law 
and to summon the subjects to defend against outside transgressors.24 The sovereign’s 
right to wield death means that his subjects are always super-positioned between life 
and death. Life, is thus for the subjects, something that the sovereign lets you and 
allows for you to have rather than is your natural right.25 
The law under this model symbolizes the sovereign’s will and any 
transgression against the law is thus considered a transgression against the sovereign 
himself and a challenge to his sovereignty; consequently transgressions are met with 
punishment. Since the law symbolizes the sovereign’s will, under this mode, the 
courts are only interested in knowing whether the defendant is guilty of breaking the 
law or not before physical punishments like torture is prescribed if guilt was proven.26 
The punishment seeks revenge against the transgressor and creates fear in the other 
subjects, as opposed to the courts taking interest into the motives and conditions that 
led the subject to commit the transgression against the law and prescribing corrective 
measures for instance.27 
Foucault identifies four essential characteristics to this mode of power as it 
operated in the Middle-Ages. First, the founding procedure by which the sovereign is 
granted power; the sovereign is granted sovereign status not by virtue of any intrinsic 
value but by an external justification such as divine right.28 Second, the sovereign’s 
intervention in the lives of individuals is always subtractive, taking away land, 
money, resources and even life if the sovereign demands it.29 Third, the punitive 
measures are exercised publicly where the masses of the subjects can witness the 
event and fear the sovereign as he displays his sovereignty over the territory and its 
inhabitants.30 Examples of such physical punishments that are directed at the body 
and made into a public spectacle are public executions, public floggings and so on.31 
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This concludes the main characteristics of sovereign power according to 
Foucault within the context of its operation during the Middle-Ages. For the purposes 
of this essay, however, sovereign power has to be distinguishable after being de-
contextualized from its Middle-Age context in Foucault. While Foucault believes that 
sovereign power declines in the modern state32, he nevertheless does not completely 
exclude its role in the governance of modern states but rather claims that its role is 
undermined by other modes of power with the advent of modernity.33 The fact that 
sovereign power persists today in even the most modernized states is a reason it is of 
relevance to this essay as a tool of analysis. Another reason for its relevance is that in 
times of great distress, people tend to turn to the law, in its form of being synonymous 
to sovereign will, with their demands. The law is usually conceived as an embodiment 
of the rules by which a sovereign should rule. In modern states, the law is generally 
perceived to prescribe citizens’ rights and the state’s duties towards the citizens and 
so when the citizens feel oppressed, they turn to the law with their demands since the 
law, in their view, should be the sovereign’s will.     
For the purposes of this essay, sovereign power will be identifiable by the 
following three essential characteristics. First, there exists an asymmetrical 
relationship between the sovereign and the non-sovereign. This means that such form 
of power does not exist between two equals. This power relationship can exist 
between a king and his subordinates or a master and a slave or a policeman and a 
civilian. This non-equality is protected and supported by the second characteristic, 
which is that the superior party is able to exercise a subtractive punishment on the 
inferior party. Here again the threat of violence is what protects the sovereign status 
against the resistance of the non-sovereigns. The sovereign status, however, is not one 
where the sovereign is necessarily an individual like a monarch or an emperor but 
rather any entity, such as a government, that almost holds a monopoly on violence in 
a particular territory. Third, sovereign power is discontinuous in the sense that the 
spectacle of its punishments and the effects of the punishments are not always active 
on the subjects but rather occur at various separated times. Sovereign power thus 
exists essentially in asymmetrical relationships between non-equals where sovereignty 
is protected by the threat of spectacular intermittent violence.   
2. Disciplinary power: 
The sovereign mode of power was prevalent in the governance of people during the 
majority of pre-modern history and particularly the Middle-Ages. Foucault’s analysis 
in “Discipline and Punish” contrasts it with the second mode of power namely 
disciplinary power. In Foucault’s genealogy, disciplinary power began to strongly 
propagate in the 16th century gradually displacing the ancient above-mentioned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  FOUCAULT,	  supra	  note___	  at	  136.	  
33	  Id.	  at	  138.	  
	   10	  
sovereign mode in the classical age and finally becoming the most prevalent mode of 
power in the 18th century.34 
Unlike sovereign power, disciplinary power takes an interest in the specific 
behaviour of every individual rather than to merely set boundaries as to what is 
punishable and what is permissible.35 It seeks to reinforce a particular behavioural 
norm that individuals follow as if it was drawing a line that subjects have to walk on 
as opposed to drawing borders that subjects aren’t allowed to cross. In doing so, it 
relies on three primary techniques: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment 
and examination. 
Hierarchical observation is a technique whereby the subject is continuously 
put under surveillance or at least is under the impression that he is always under 
surveillance.36 Any individual behaves differently in the presence of others or under 
the gaze of others. Children behave better in the presence of their parents for example 
or in the presence of strangers. This phenomenon, that people behave differently when 
they are being observed compared to when they aren’t, has always persisted 
throughout human history. Foucault however was probably the first to generalize it as 
a system of governance.  
Foucault found Bentham’s Panopticon as the perfect model for showing how 
disciplinary power works through surveillance.37 Foucault believed that Bentham is 
more important than Kant and Hegel in understanding modernity by virtue of his 
making discipline generalizable as a mode of governance of societies. The Panopticon 
is a design for a modern prison where a guard is placed at a watchtower from which 
he can observe all the prisoners at any time. The watchtower is placed in the centre of 
a giant courtyard and the prison cells and recreational areas circle the watchtower at 
the centre. The watchtower guard is invisible to the prisoners but all the prisoners are 
visible to his gaze.38 This system allows to rather than tie the prisoners to the wall 
using chains, the Panopticon has the prisoners physically free but under the 
impression that they are continuously being observed at all times even when the guard 
is not really observing them. Each individual prisoner under this impression believes 
that at any moment they might be under observation and as such always have the 
internal urge to behave in accordance with the norms and rules of the prison. Here, the 
prisoner internalizes the disciplining process and practices self-discipline just by 
virtue of being possibly constantly observed. Observation or the illusion of continuous 
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observation, as the Panopticon example shows, thus internalizes the disciplining 
process in its subjects, making individuals behave. 
While in the Panopticon example, the one guard is observing the many 
prisoners, it is not a necessary condition for the effectiveness of disciplinary power. 
The many can very well observe the many or the one. It is the gaze that has a 
disciplining effect and its effectiveness is maximized when it involves having a 
network of individuals placed in a hierarchy, like in a factory, school, or hospital for 
instance, whereas each individual inside the network is placed in a visible position 
where they both observe others and are observed. Discipline makes each individual in 
the network internalize the norms of the network and behave in accordance to them. 
Even individuals at the top of the hierarchical pyramid are subjects of disciplinary 
power since being observed by their subordinates makes them internalize discipline. 
In Foucault’s own words: 
Although surveillance rests on individuals, its functioning is that of a network 
of relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from bottom to top 
and laterally; this network holds the whole together and traverses it in its 
entirety with effects of power that derive from one another: supervisors, 
perpetually supervised.39   
The second technique through which disciplinary power expands is normalizing 
judgment. Of what use is it to observe individuals if their behaviour is left un-judged? 
Under disciplinary power, not only is everyone both observer and observed; everyone 
is also judge and defendant. Others judge an individual’s behaviour within the 
hierarchal network as to whether they live up to the prevalent normative behaviour or 
not. Adherents to the correct behaviour are labelled normal while deviants are judged 
abnormal, so every departure from the established correct behaviour is punished. 
Exercises are prescribed in order to correct deviants. Adherence to correct behaviour 
is rewarded thereby establishing a hierarchy of good and bad 
individuals.40Hierarchical observation combined with normative judgment thus 
imposes a measure on individuals to keep them in control and regulate their 
behaviour. Usually the norm is a manner of being docile and providing utility. Each 
disciplinary institution has its own norms. The norms of a prison are different than the 
norms of a school than those of a hospital or an asylum. 
The third technique combines the first two techniques on a regular basis 
creating a normalizing observation. While observation objectifies the observed and 
normalizing judgments provide a standard criterion of differentiating between 
conformists and deviants, examination provides an evaluation of each individual’s 
behaviour. Under examination, Foucault understands the processes of documenting 
information about individuals, which come with testing, treating them as objects and 
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tracking their development.41 Examination thus provides and continuously makes use 
of knowledge in tracking individuals’ behavioural patterns, correcting them and 
evaluating the effectiveness of the corrective measures. 
Internalizing discipline can occur in a variety of ways. One may internalize 
discipline and behave in accordance to norms out of conviction, fear or habit. Being 
disciplined out of conviction is for the subject to actually believe in the norm and its 
correctness. A convicted and believing subject will aspire to live up to the norm and 
would not necessarily require to be observed as much as whom that conforms due to 
fear but without conviction. The average citizen going through a full medical check-
up aspires to be judged healthy and sane and works towards that end and fears being 
judged insane or ill out of a belief in the goodness of sanity and health over insanity 
and sickness. 
The internalizing of discipline through fear of retribution, on the other hand, 
requires the subject to be continuously observed or at least under the impression of 
being continuously possibly observed. Without observation, the subject will cease to 
behave unless that behaviour has become a habit. A simple example that can show the 
various ways one can internalize discipline and behave according to the norms is that 
of a homosexual individual in a highly conservative culture like that of the Middle-
East. One possibility for a homosexual in that environment is to believe the religious 
rhetoric that accuses him of sickness and thus believe himself to be sick and aspire to 
participate in conversion therapy and to behave as a heterosexual. Here, the 
homosexual believes in the norm and tries to conform to it. Another possibility for 
that individual is to not believe in the norm and to perceive himself as healthy and 
normal and yet pretend to be heterosexual out of fear of prosecution or social 
alienation. The final possibility is to internalize discipline in one of the latter fashions 
but to have his behaviour then conditioned as a habit over time.  
While Foucault does not explicitly make these precise distinctions in the 
manners of which one can internalize discipline, he considers them all as effects of 
disciplinary power.  In fact, Foucault notes in Security, Territory and Population that 
disciplinary power was present during the spectacular executions and punishments 
performed on transgressors under the sovereign model of power. In a public 
execution, sovereign power is exercised on the transgressor while a discontinuous 
disciplinary power is exercised over the masses watching the spectacle.42The purpose 
of the spectacle was to internalize the witnessing subjects’ discipline out of fear rather 
than out of conviction. In Foucault’s own words: 
It is absolutely clear that in the juridico-legal system, which functioned, or at 
any rate was dominant, until the eighteenth century, the disciplinary side was 
far from being absent since, after all, when a so-called exemplary punishment 
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was apparently of little importance or consequence, it was in fact precisely 
with the aim of having corrective effect, if not on the culprit himself-because 
he was hardly corrected if he was hung-then at least on the rest of the 
population. To that extent, the practice of public torture and execution as an 
example was a corrective and disciplinary technique.43 
 
It is worth noting that disciplinary power is characterised by being continuous, which 
is not the case in spectacular punishments, and this, might be the reason behind the 
spectacle’s relative modern obsoleteness since the spectacle’s disciplinary effect is 
incomplete by being discontinuous.   
In the classical age, Foucault notes, disciplinary power was permeating 
through the societies by means of institutions or disciplinary networks, such as 
schools, workshops, asylums etc…44 With modernity looming, however, power 
became increasingly de-centralized from the monarch and shifted towards service 
institutions like schools, universities, hospitals and factories.45 The judiciary became 
interested in why a criminal broke the law rather than merely whether they broke the 
law. Punitive measures shifted from being dominantly vengeful, violent, fear 
generating and public to being dominantly corrective.46The purpose of punishment 
shifted from being deterring crime through generating fear of physical pain in 
individuals to being reforming and rehabilitating individuals. The soul, thus, is the 
subject of this power rather than the body. Adherence to behavioural norms became 
the standard for judgment in the courtrooms and in civil society. Social and medical 
sciences became the tools by which the normal and the abnormal are defined.47 
Disciplinary power is thus primarily concerned with controlling individual 
minds rather than punishing bodies. It seeks to render its subjects both useful and 
docile and seeks to bind and strengthen the relationship of the former to the latter so 
that the more docile the individual the more utility they provide. Discipline is not 
directly and visibly imposed by the institutions, but is rather internalized as values and 
norms in the individual and consequentially society as whole making the many 
observe the many. The subject under this mode of power thus, practices self-discipline 
as one tries to conform to the norms for one reason or another. It is rather an 
unspectacular, continuous mode of power compared to its predecessor yet more 
effective and encompassing. Through disciplinary power, individuals become more 
alike and their combined efforts become of more utility.  
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3. Bio-power & Governmentality: 
The permeation of disciplinary power in institutions during the classical age 
culminated in a new way of governance in the modern age. It gave the landscape for 
the rise of new technologies of power in the governmentality and political sphere that 
Foucault famously calls bio-power. Foucault discusses bio-power at great length in 
Security, Territory and Population and The Birth of Bio-Politics. Foucault contrasts 
bio-power with sovereign power. The latter is described as “the right to take life or let 
live” while the former (bio-power) is described as “the right to make live and to let 
die”.48 With modernity’s advent, the deductive and destructive nature of sovereign 
power becomes complemented and largely replaced by the productive and enhancing 
bio-power. This means that unlike sovereign power, whose rationality is only negative 
and deductive, bio-power has a positive productive rationality. Bio-power is thus a 
productive power that through regulation seeks to control and manage its subjects’ 
lives. The ‘bio’ part of the term refers to that power’s interest in the life and health of 
its subjects. Foucault writes:  
[of] a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power, in which 
"deduction" would be replaced by a power "working to incite, reinforce, 
control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on 
generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one 
dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them.49  
Bio-power’s targets of control are populations rather than bodies. Its era witnesses the 
burgeoning of countless techniques aimed at the control of populations. It does not 
just differ from sovereign power in terms of its objectives but also in terms of its 
instruments. The main instrument of bio-power is corrective and regulatory 
disciplinary techniques that are based on knowledge. Power, under this mode, 
becomes interested in studying trends in mortality rates, health rates, employment 
rates, birth rates and the likes and becomes strongly tied to knowledge. Foucault 
writes: 
The new technology that is being established is addressed to a multiplicity of 
men, not to the extent that they are nothing more than their individual bodies, 
but to the extent that they form, on the contrary, a global mass that is affected 
by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so 
on . . . we have a second seizure of power that is not individualizing but, if you 
like, massifying, that is directed not at man-as-body but at man-as-species.50  
It employs scientific mechanisms for gathering information about populations and has 
disciplinary mechanisms that make use of the sciences to administer and regulate 
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these populations. Foucault calls these information-gathering mechanisms as 
Power/knowledge regimes.   
Bio-power is thus quite similar to disciplinary power with the main difference 
lying in the level of focus that each has. Disciplinary power is interested in controlling 
the individual, while Bio-power is interested in controlling populations. It treats 
populations as an object that is different than the sum of its individual parts. A 
population, of let’s say farmers, has its own trends and behavioural patterns that are 
unknowable by merely studying an individual farmer of that population. Bio-power is 
thus revealed to be more macro and encompassing than disciplinary power. 
Disciplinary power can even be seen as a subset or a tool of bio-power. For instance, 
disciplinary power is interested in controlling each criminal and correcting him as to 
avoid further criminal activity from him. It is interested in the physical and 
psychological conditions that made the criminal commit the crime. Bio-power shares 
the same interests of disciplinary power, since discipline is a subset of it, but it is also 
interested in overall crime rates and seeing as to whether it is on the rise or on the fall 
and prescribing solutions for controlling it. Bio-power accordingly, works on both 
micro and macro levels; its disciplinary micro aspect working through institutions and 
its macro-aspect working through the state.51 
An important distinction between bio-power and sovereign power is how each 
treats the use of violence and the death of its subjects. While sovereign power 
punished spectacularly as in line with its objectives and instruments, bio-power‘s 
objectives and instruments are productive and thus have to treat the use of violence 
and death productively. Bio-power seeks to exclude and hide violence and death 
rather than parade them. The use of violence and death is masked as something else 
that is productive and optimal for the lives of the population. Foucault notes that bio-
powers have to declare a group within the population as abnormal before it can use 
violence against them. He argued that this “biological racism” portrays a segment of 
the general population as a threat to the improvement of the rest of the populations. In 
doing this bio-power thus lives up to its description of “to make live or let die” by 
letting a small portion of the population die to enhance and improve the health of the 
rest. Foucault writes 
In the bio-political system . . . killing, or the imperative to kill, is acceptable 
only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the 
elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or 
race . . . Once the State functions in the bio-power mode, racism alone can 
justify the murderous function of the State.52   
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Bio-power is thus typical of modern states, which view their subjects not as juridical 
subjects but rather as objects of care. Foucault outlines a genealogy of the modern 
state and traces that care towards the subjects back to the pastoral care typical of 
Christian thought. The ruler as the leader and caretaker characteristic of modern states 
is an evolution and an extension of the Christian idea of the shepherd leading his 
flock. Foucault puts it, “the shepherd directs the whole flock, but he can only really 
direct it insofar as not a single sheep escapes him”.53 In light of racism and pastoral 
care, modern states are thus bio-power apparatuses that seek to regulate and 
administer populations using disciplinary technologies and science to manage the 
behavioural patterns of its population out of care for its well being. 
Foucault’s discussions of the various modes of power, as explicated above, 
were all discussed in particular contexts for each power mode. Foucault never utilizes 
his power modes in analysing the power relationships that underlie an occupation. 
Sovereign power, for example, was always discussed in a relation between a 
sovereign and his subjects but not between a sovereign and another sovereign’s 
subjects. Moreover, in his genealogy of the modern state, he discussed how modern 
states, under bio-power, utilize bio-political and disciplinary technologies to 
normalize and administer the lives of their populations but not the populations of 
other states to which the state might not care for their control. I propose that the same 
technologies of bio-power that are used as instruments for states to control the lives of 
its populations, and in normal conditions improve it, could be employed to control 
and improve or deteriorate the well-being of another state’s population if the context 
allows it. 
This essay will thus treat the power technologies and instruments discussed by 
Foucault as employable for purposes other than the care for the control of its 
population. In light of this, in this essay I will treat the West Bank as a battlefield of 
Foucauldian powers, where the state of Israel and the Palestinian Authority are two 
competing state apparatuses utilizing sovereign, disciplinary and bio-political 
technologies to varying success. 
The Foucauldian analysis will focus on the primary ways through which Israel 
explicitly intervenes in Palestinian affairs, to reveal each of the intervention 
mechanisms as either performing a regulatory function or an incapacitating one or 
both, in making two connected arguments. The first argument is that the state of Israel 
employs sovereign, disciplinary and bio-political technologies to regulate the 
Westbank’s Palestinian population despite the Oslo Accords and the establishment of 
the PA. The second argument is that the Israeli sovereign and bio-political 
technologies, which comprise the occupation’s structure, diminish if not completely 
incapacitate the PA from performing its regulatory duties as a state apparatus. In other 
words, the second argument seeks to show how the Israeli mechanisms of 
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intervention, namely the erection of check points, the building and maintaining of 
settlements and the uses of law in the West Bank, sabotages the conditions for the 
possibility of the PA’s functioning as a proper bio-power apparatus.   
Throughout this essay, I will refer to the act of incapacitating a state apparatus 
from being an effective bio-power apparatus as an act of ‘dispowering’ that renders an 
apparatus ‘dispowered’. This neologism is introduced to describe the special state of 
affairs for a state apparatus where the conditions for making the governance, in a bio-
political sense, of a particular population possible are absent. The neologism is a 
minor alteration on the term disempower only disempowerment wrongfully suggests a 
power that was once held and was later lost which is not the case with the PA.          
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III. Checkpoints: 
This section will explain how Israeli checkpoints at various locations along the roads 
of the occupied territory regulate the lives of the Palestinian population in the West 
Bank and dispowers the Palestinian authority. But first, a brief overview of the types 
of checkpoints must be given.  
Checkpoints can be internal or external and fixed or flying.  Internal 
checkpoints are those that are located deep within Palestinian territory in the West 
Bank while external checkpoints are those that are located outside of the Palestinian 
territory or at the borders of the territory. Fixed checkpoints are those whose locations 
are permanent and are stationary while flying checkpoints are moving, surprise 
checkpoints. As of February 2014, there are 99 fixed checkpoints 59 of which are 
internal.54 Furthermore, in 2013 the UN’s Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs counted a monthly average of 256 flying checkpoints erected on 
West Bank roads.55 
In erecting checkpoints, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) or the Israeli police, 
depending on the location, purchases, installs and fully operates checkpoints or they 
privatize the whole operation.56 In either case, the average Palestinian passing through 
a checkpoint experiences most of the following: passing through a metal detector, a 
luggage scan, a submission of the work permit and a magnetic card and a full body 
search where full body scanners are unavailable.57 Moreover, armed soldiers, 
policemen or contracted civilian security guards are present with K-9 Police dogs and 
Patrol vehicles at the checkpoints to operate the equipment, perform the searches 
handle dissent and filter crossers.58 Additionally, the arduous process of passing 
through checkpoints is often times accompanied by long delays, verbal harassment 
and long lines of crossers.59 
The regulatory nature of checkpoints is exemplified it its functions of managing 
circulation, and its disciplining effect on Palestinians. Foucault’s ideas on 
geography’s role in bio-political relationships reveal how the Israeli checkpoints do 
more than just protect settlements and settler populations but also regulate and 
administer Palestinian lives. While Foucault’s thoughts on space and geography are 
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vague and perhaps under-developed, some of its elements are key for analyzing power 
relations. Foucault treats space, in the context of power, not as absolute Cartesian 
space but rather as relational space.60 By relational space, Foucault is concerned with 
where individuals are positioned with respect to each other and what type of power 
relationship that each spatial arrangement between individuals implies.61 In the 
Panopticon for example, the disciplinary power relationship is possible only on the 
condition that the spatial arrangement of prisoners with respect to the watchtower 
guard renders the prisoners visible and the guard invisible. The architectural design of 
the Panopticon is thus a spatial arrangement that is absolutely essential for the 
successful disciplining of the prisoners.62 
In line with the insight that spatial orderings condition the possibilities of 
power relationships, Foucault discussed geography within the context of bio-politics 
and modern states. Foucault saw geography as a regime of knowledge/power where 
governments’ urban planners, using scientific tools and disciplines, gather 
information about the qualities of the territory and determine the logistics of how the 
circulation of people, goods, money, water and the likes will take place.63 Modern 
states, under the regime of bio-power, take an interest in regulating circulation and in 
differentiating between good and bad circulation because of circulation’s strong 
effects on the wealth, health, and migration etc… of its citizenry.64 If contaminated 
water for example was to freely circulate to resident areas, the health of that area’s 
residents will be affected. If a territory is starved of resources, people will tend to 
migrate from it to more resourceful territories. Along the same lines, the higher the 
population density of a particular city, the higher the rates of infections and disease 
amongst the members of that city’s population. Examples in that mould elucidate how 
spatial arrangements and the management of circulation are heavily tied to 
phenomena that states as bio-power apparatuses are interested to control. 
Circulation management is thus an essential technology of bio-power or rather 
a condition for the possibility of having effective bio-political tools. In managing 
circulation through the urban planning of roads, states normalize the use of roads by 
placing state or private employees to supervise the use of the roads. Traffic police, 
Traffic signs, checkpoints and toll stations for example are installed to manage the 
roads circulation. These mini-institutions are themselves normalized as well. 
As previously mentioned, one type of checkpoints that the state of Israel erects 
is internal to the West Bank territory. As of 2013, there are 59 internal checkpoints 
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erected on West Bank roads, not including the frequent random flying checkpoints.65 
By installing these checkpoints Israel effectively manages circulation in the West 
Bank. Checkpoint guards can allow, deny or delay passage; they can even arrest and 
detain Palestinian crossers. Through checkpoints, Israel can thus manipulate 
employment rates, mortality rates and literacy rates of the Palestinian population by 
increasing or diminishing logistical access to markets, hospitals and schools for 
instance. Roads are an essential component of any state’s infrastructure and by 
denying, allowing or delaying the passage of Palestinians, Israel effectively manages 
West Bank roads; a major component of Palestinian infrastructure and a condition for 
the possibility of the PA’s governing. The regulation of a main component of the 
West Bank’s infrastructure gives Israel an instrument for interfering with the 
economy and health of the West Bank population both of which are objects of 
administration for bio-power apparatuses. In erecting checkpoints, Israel thus 
regulates and administers Palestinian life by controlling circulation and subsequently 
controlling Palestinians’ access to health, trade and education. 
The regulatory function of checkpoints is not just exemplified by control of 
circulation; it is also exemplified by the checkpoints’ surveillance systems’ 
disciplinary effect on crossers. While the surveillance and security apparatus might 
vary across different checkpoints, the following systems are widely installed across 
fixed checkpoints and could thus serve as a sample for gaining insights about the 
power structures underlying the fixed checkpoints’ relationship with Palestinian 
subjects. Analysis of checkpoints’ surveillance systems will now follow. 
A. Fixed Checkpoints: 
Fixed checkpoints with the aforementioned types of technologies and personnel 
permeate all three modes of power.  The presence of the sovereign mode of power is 
apparent by virtue of two observations: Firstly, the use of armed guards and armed 
patrol vehicles in operating and securing the checkpoint against the subjects. 
Secondly, the physically violent fashion by which dissent or non-compliance is 
handled and the occasional public nature of punitive measures that are taken against 
non-docile subjects. The use of physical force against the body of the subject is a 
characteristic of sovereign power where the sovereign’s will demands the compliance 
of the Palestinian subject to the difficult security procedures and publicly punishes 
dissenters and non-docile subjects. Violence at checkpoints has been thoroughly 
documented in the past. In a press release by the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics in 2011, it was documented that 8% of Palestinians in the West Bank 
between the ages of 18-29 suffer from physical violence in the checkpoints.66 
Sovereign power thus permeates between the state of Israel and Palestinian civilians 
in the checkpoint arrangement.       
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Sovereign power is not the only mode of power present in the fixed 
checkpoint arrangement. Disciplinary power is heavily present on subjects passing 
through the checkpoints.  As discussed in the section on disciplinary power, 
hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment and examination are the three main 
techniques of disciplinary power.  The hierarchical observation technique is satisfied 
in the checkpoint arrangement. The guards and the surveillance technology observe 
subjects, as they await their turn to pass through the checkpoint and as they are going 
through the checkpoint. Here the guard is ‘superior’, in the hierarchal sense, to the 
subjects and is observing them and judging each subject as to whether his/her 
behaviour is in compliance with the norms of being a ‘docile crossers’.   
A well-behaving subject in this situation is the docile and cooperative 
individual that refrains from any sudden or violent verbal or physical action. Formal 
guidelines as to how a crosser should behave are lacking however, general obedience 
and patience is expected of crossers. This demonstrates the presence of the second 
technique of disciplinary power namely normalizing judgment. Subjects are observed 
and judged on the basis of their observed behaviour as to whether they should be 
allowed to pass or sent home and in some cases detained.   
The phases of passing through the metal detectors, the luggage scans and the 
presentation of magnetic ID’s and work permits and the full body search are a clear 
example of the third technique of disciplinary power, namely the examination. The 
surveillance and security technology on the checkpoint location examines each 
subject and determines the effectiveness of the disciplining process. Crossers must 
present valid work permits and in some checkpoints magnetic cards that the guards 
can use to review each subject’s security and personal history but that will be 
discussed at length later in this section. 
The satisfaction of all three disciplinary power techniques has thus been 
demonstrated. Under the effect of these three techniques, Palestinians, who pass 
through the checkpoints, become subjects of disciplinary power. They internalize the 
disciplining process by behaving in a docile manner while waiting in line, by making 
sure their luggage and their person are free of any material that might be deemed as 
threatening to security and by obtaining their IDs and work permits and keeping them 
on at all times. Here discipline is internalized out fear of retribution rather than out of 
conviction. The internalized discipline in this case, however, is discontinuous rather 
than continuous. The activity of self-discipline exists only insofar that the crosser is in 
the queue, crossing or having just crossed through the checkpoint. The discontinuous 
disciplining here is reminiscent of how the masses were disciplined by watching the 
spectacular execution of a criminal by the sovereign in the Middle-Ages. In both these 
cases, self-discipline is exercised by the subjects but only for a temporary amount of 
time and out of fear of the sovereign’s threat of violence. It is thus a case where the 
method of control is a borderline between sovereign and discipline.   
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In addition to Sovereign and Disciplinary power’s presence in the surveillance 
and security apparatus at most checkpoints, bio-power is also manifested. Bio-
power’s manifestation is clearly demonstrated by the checkpoint’s requiring of 
subjects to present magnetic ID cards to be able to pass through the checkpoint. The 
magnetic ID cards referred to earlier is key to the operation of a population 
surveillance and control system called “the Basel System”.67 EDS Israel, a subsidiary 
of the famous electronics corporate Hewlett Packard, is the primary contractor of the 
Basel system. The “biometric database law” was passed by the Israeli Kenesset in 
2009 and was subsequently installed at the West Bank checkpoints in Jericho, 
Bethlehem, Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Hebron, Abudis, Tarkumia and the Ephraim 
Gate by 2010.68 
The Basel system software is a huge information system with a database that 
collects and analyzes biometric information about the cardholders, which in this case 
are Palestinian workers. Its features include hand and facial recognition, as well as, 
the security history and personal information about each individual in the database. 
According to WhoProfits.Org, holding these magnetic cards has been required of 
Palestinians who wish to work in Israel or on Israeli settlements since 2005.69 
Consequently, the system probably holds biometric as well as personal and security 
information about almost every member of the Palestinian population in the West 
Bank above the age of 16.70  
That the Basel system is a manifestation of bio-power is easily noticeable. 
Bio-power is a power that seeks to regulate the lives of populations. It relies on the 
statistical disciplines in gathering information and regulating behavior through the 
arms of the state. The Knesset’s passing of the law and the military’s purchasing of 
the system and it’s contracting to HP’s subsidiary EDS Israel for installing and 
maintaining the system is an indicator of the state’s role in the creation of that 
biometric system. The personnel operating the system and performing continuous 
decisions regarding whether a given subject is to be allowed to pass through the 
checkpoint are IDF soldiers, policemen or private security guards contracted by the 
former two groups, which are all extensions of the state. 
          The guards’ decisions themselves are detrimental to the lives of the subjects 
involved in the process. Their economic wellbeing, their access to health, work and 
education among other things are affected by whether they are allowed to pass and 
proceed to work, whether they get to work on time, whether they are detained or told 
to return home or seek other routes for instance. 
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The existence of the Basel system thus, further supports the argument made earlier 
that checkpoints are bio-political instruments that regulate the West Bank’s 
circulation. 
On the subjects’ front, bio-power’s disciplinary element is active by virtue of 
the Basel system. By being aware that the guards at the checkpoints have access to 
their personal and security records, they internalize discipline on a consistent and 
continuous basis as to avoid having a bad history that would impede their future 
endeavours of crossing through checkpoints. Anger, frustration or other negative 
emotions are repressed and self-control is exercised to ensure a safe passage. 
Sovereign power permeates by virtue of the presence of potential violence by the 
armed guards whose decision making is aided by the system’s database of the 
Palestinian subjects. 
I have thus explicated the power structures underlying the fixed checkpoint 
surveillance with all three techniques mapped by Foucault satisfied during the waiting 
in line and passage process. Bio-power too is demonstrably detectable through the 
analysis of the biometric database: the Basel System. The next section will look at the 
power structure underlying flying internal checkpoints.   
B. Flying Checkpoints: 
The surveillance and security apparatus in flying checkpoints is more or less similar 
to the apparatus at fixed checkpoints. Consequently, the same power structures that 
were discussed in the last section probably persist in flying checkpoints too. However, 
the random and surprising element exclusive to flying checkpoints and the rate at 
which they are erected deems it worthy of analysis. As mentioned earlier, in 2013 the 
UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs counted a monthly average 
of 256 flying checkpoints erected along West Bank roads. This amounts to an average 
of 8 to 9 random checkpoints in the West Bank per day.71   
The frequency at which these flying checkpoints are erected indicates that 
Palestinians will probably be wary of the checkpoints popping up unexpectedly. The 
lack of predictability of the flying checkpoints suggests that disciplinary power 
permeates between the flying checkpoints as a whole and the Palestinian subjects in a 
manner that is somewhat reminiscent to Bentham’s Panopticon. As discussed in the 
section on Foucault, Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon was a prison design whose main 
concept was that watchtower is placed in the centre of the prison where the watch 
guard could observe all of the inmates, while the inmates could never tell whether 
they are being observed at each particular point in time or not. Foucault used the 
prisoners’ state, of not knowing whether they are actually being observed or not but 
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knowing that they could be observed, in explicating the hierarchal observation 
technique through which disciplinary power works on the prisoners.72 
Similarly, in the case of the frequent erection of flying checkpoints, 
Palestinians using West Bank roads are generally aware of the position of fixed 
checkpoints, where they are certain they would be observed, searched, and judged. 
They, however, are unaware of whether they are going to run into flying checkpoints 
but know that they could run into one at any point given how frequently and randomly 
these check points are erected. Thus, Palestinians walking streets that do not have 
fixed check points do not know whether they will go through the arduous disciplinary 
procedure of passing through a checkpoint but do know that they could go through it 
if a flying checkpoint pops up. Unlike the fixed checkpoints, flying checkpoints thus 
subject Palestinians to disciplinary control continuously. Consequently, Palestinians 
thus internalize the disciplining process at all times, as if they are always going 
through a checkpoint, in the same manner the Panopticon’s prisoners internalize 
discipline and become docile as if the watchtower guard is always observing them. 
 
         Moreover, the disciplining effect of checkpoint crossers is transferable to non-
checkpoint crossers. This is analogous to how the prison for Foucault works on the 
non-prisoned population by virtue of what happens in the prison. How prisoners make 
non-prisoners docile is also analogous to how the disciplining of the insane in 
asylums transfers to the sane who always fear being found insane and thus behave 
‘sanely’ and docilely. For the Palestinian citizens of the West Bank, the disciplining 
effect on crossers transfers to those who aren’t crossing. The latter group fear being 
found a threat to security since that would lead to their detainment or their abuse even 
while they are not crossing and thus exercise self-discipline continuously.  
The disciplinary power permeating through the erection of flying checkpoints 
is thus demonstrably more effective than that of fixed checkpoints. Flying checkpoints 
do not only share the power dynamics that underlie fixed checkpoints, but also 
include a much stronger disciplinary element, purely by virtue of being randomly 
placed and more invisible. This leaves Palestinian subjects with the impression that 
they might be being observed and also makes the disciplinary effects of the 
checkpoints on crossers transferable to those who are not crossing at that instant. 
        Now that Checkpoints have been demonstrated to serve a regulatory function for 
the state of Israel, through managing circulation and disciplining subjects, I will argue 
that it serves to dispower the Palestinian Authority at the same time. As previously 
mentioned, a modern state apparatus’ dispowerment occurs when the conditions for 
the possibility of it operating as a bio-power are made absent. Moreover, circulation 
management was previously explained to serve as both a bio-political technology that 
bio-powers employ to regulate and administer the lives of its populations and a 
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condition for the possibility of utilizing other bio-political technologies. Therefore, if 
a state was incapacitated with regards to circulation management, it is rendered 
impotent as a bio-power apparatus. 
Effective circulation management with regards to roads assumes that the state 
can catalyse good circulation and impede bad circulation. In the West Bank, the 
presence of Israeli checkpoints obstructs this operation. The presence of Israeli 
checkpoints sabotages the PA’s attempts to normalize the use of roads since the 
managing effects of traffic police, toll booths and similar mini-institutions becomes 
nullified by the checkpoints’ sabotaging of those very effects. Checkpoints for 
instance can congest and direct traffic in a manner reminiscent of poor circulation. 
Even if checkpoints intended no regulation of traffic at all, it still at the very least 
defines the possible choices for PA managerial normalizing activities by virtue of its 
existence in staggering amounts. 
This chapter has thus shown how Israel utilizes checkpoints as bio-political 
instruments that regulate Palestinian life and dispower the Palestinian Authority. 
Illuminating its role in circulation management showed the regulatory function of 
checkpoints. Analyzing the surveillance systems installed at fixed and flying 
checkpoints also showed the regulatory function of checkpoints. The dispowering 
function of checkpoints was shown by illuminating its incapacitating effects on the 
PA’s own circulation management functions. 
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IV. Settlements: 
Settlements are exclusively Israeli communities created by the state of Israel on the 
territories it occupied in 1967. The aftermath of the 1967 war saw numerous 
settlements erected in the Golan Heights, Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, Sinai, the 
Gaza Strip and most importantly the West Bank. The settlement program in Sinai and 
the Gaza strip has ceased, however it is still active in the West Bank. Settlements that 
were built past the 1967 green line on the Palestinian side were found to be illegal 
under International law by the International Court of Justice.73 The state of Israel 
however, has its own classification for the types of settlements based on legal status 
under Israeli law. Settlements that are officially approved by the Israeli government 
are called just settlements while those who are not officially approved by the 
government are called illegal outposts.74 As of 2013, there are 124 official settlements 
and approximately one hundred outposts in the West Bank. Official settlements have 
approved planning schemes and receive the same services that towns located inside 
Israel receive. Outposts on the other hand lack planning schemes approval but are 
indirectly supported by Israeli institutions and are given state-funded protection in 
most cases despite their illegal status.75 Both settlements and outposts combined 
control about 42% of the West Bank’s territory.76 
This chapter will discuss how Israeli settlements are bio-political instruments 
of regulation and dispowerment. Settlements will be shown to perform a regulatory 
function with respect to the West Bank’ Palestinian population and a dispowering 
function with respect to the Palestinian Authority state apparatus. In showing 
settlements’ regulatory function, this chapter will analyse the settlements’ relationship 
to the Palestinian labor force, and settlements’ surveillance and security systems. 
Moreover, this chapter will analyze settlements’ bypass road network and its land 
confiscation mechanism towards showing settlements’ dispowering effect. 
Settlements regulate a portion of the Palestinian labor population by virtue of 
its providing of employment in an economy ridden with a high unemployment rate of 
23%.77  For the settlements’ industries, Palestinian laborers are an opportunity to hire 
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cheap skilled labor. Salaries handed out in the settlements service industry are on 
average 33% higher than salaries handed out in the same sector outside of settlements 
rendering the prospect of working at settlements financially lucrative. Consequentially 
16.1% of the West Bank’s entire labor force is employed either in Israel or in Israeli 
settlements.78 
The financial well being of West Bank Palestinians is thus financially tied to 
the erection of settlements and the access to employment in settlement services. This 
implies that the state of Israel is in a position to influence the West Bank’s 
employment rates and salary levels by means of its control over the construction and 
erection of new settlements and by limiting the Palestinians’ access to settlement jobs. 
This influence through the settlement-building program is thus a bio-political 
technology that the state of Israel can employ to alter the economic behavior and 
influence the economic state of Palestinians. The subjects of Israeli bio-power, in this 
case, are thus the Palestinian labor population. The object of knowledge and control is 
that population’s employment rate and average incomes. What constitutes the normal, 
however, varies depending on the intensity of Israel’s closure policy as will be shown 
in a later section of this essay. Settlements thus have a regulatory function with 
respect to the West Bank’s labor population’s employment and income levels.     
As previously mentioned, settlements and outposts control about 42% of the 
West Bank’s territory. Being located on Palestinian lands, settlements require hefty 
technologically advanced surveillance and security systems to ward off any threats. 
While the surveillance and security apparatus might vary across different settlements, 
the following systems are widely installed across multiple settlements and could thus 
serve as a proper sample for gaining insights about the power structures underlying 
the settlements’ relationship with Palestinian subjects passing in its vicinity. 
A. FORTIS: 
Fortis, developed by Magal Security Systems, is a surveillance and security system 
that is installed in the Ariel, Alfei Menashe, Karnei Shomron, Shilo, Geva Binyamin 
(Adam), Tzofim, Shaked and Giva'at Ze'ev settlements.79 Its main feature is that it 
integrates perimeter control, CCTV cameras, radar technology, infrared sensors and 
information analytics with database and access control.80 Moreover, an intriguing 
feature of the system is its ability to tailor and automate workflow procedures to 
counter previously simulated scenarios.81 The system enables its user to simulate 
multiple scenarios of breach and tailor responses to these scenarios. In the event of a 
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breach that resembles a previously simulated scenario, the system reacts automatically 
according to its tailored previously set instructions.  
The Fortis system surely propagates disciplinary power on Palestinian subjects 
that might be passing in the vicinity of settlements let alone those that are thinking of 
committing an aggression. With its CCTV cameras, infrared sensors, and radar 
technology, enforcing perimeter control, the Fortis system casts a powerful 
disciplinary gaze at the external of the settlements. 
Unlike the Panopticon or the fixed checkpoints where the gaze is cast over 
existing subjects like the prisoners in the former case and crossers in the latter, 
settlement surveillance systems in general, and Fortis in particular, casts its gaze on 
an empty space or perimeter surrounding the settlements that may or may not have 
any subjects in it. It carves off a spatial perimeter in which sovereign power is 
exercised on trespassers. Disciplinary power permeates, whenever a subject is outside 
that close range to the surveillance devices but is aware of the settlement’s presence. 
The Palestinian in proximity to the settlement is aware of the danger of getting too 
close to a settlement zone out of fear of offsetting its security system. At this stage the 
subject internalizes discipline out of fear and not out of conviction. If the subject were 
to alarm the system however, he might become the subject of sovereign power as the 
system’s automated workflow reactions can be set to automatically shoot suspects. 
Fortis’ subject thus is either rendered docile by disciplinary power or eliminated by 
sovereign power.   
Moreover, Fortis’ CCTV cameras and infrared sensors are installed on the 
external of fences and gates of the settlements rendering the eye of the gazer 
somewhat visible to any potential subject.82 Fortis’ surveillance model is thus one 
where both the observer and the observed are visible to each other. This is in contrast 
with the Panopticon’s model where the observer is invisible to the prisoners while the 
prisoners are fully visible to the observer. 
B. Motorola’s systems: 
Corporate giant Motorola supplies settlements with multiple security and surveillance 
technologies.83 The most prominent of these systems is Motorola’s WASS-
STRONGHOLD system. WASS, which stands for Wide Area Surveillance System, is 
a radar system installed at key settlements that can detect a variety of targets: 
crawling, walking and running, people, vehicles, boats and swimmers at a great 
distance.84 The system is usually integrated with a command centre. 
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WASS’s STRONGHOLD model has a key feature of creating a virtual radar 
fence rather than need a real physical fence around its territory. Virtual fences are 
composed of a series of radars and optical and thermal cameras that cover a perimeter 
of up to seven hundred meters outside of the settlements. It alerts guards of any 
perimeter intrusions and its command centre has an intelligent algorithm that can 
determine human intrusions from environmental and non-human caused alarms.85  
Virtual fences create a very peculiar assortment of space between the 
observers and the observed. Once again, the gaze is cast upon a perimeter rather than 
a person only with STRONGHOLD; the perimeter is very wide and undefined to the 
Palestinian subject. The Palestinian subject is completely ignorant of how far out 
he/she has to be to trigger the system’s alarms since the perimeter is unknown to 
him/her. As a result of this ignorance about whether one is observed or not, discipline 
is internalized in subjects passing anywhere around the wide vicinity of the 
settlements out of fear that they might be getting observed. 
Another important and interesting technology supplied by Motorola is a 
solutions system called Motobridge, which connects and manages multiple 
surveillance systems across various locations like military bases, checkpoints and 
settlements. Motobridge is a technology that summons each surveillance system’s 
gaze into one system thereby placing the gaze process into a hierarchy.86 Through 
Motobridge’s bridging of surveillance systems across various locations, the hierarchal 
observation technique becomes super-amplified since it implies that when one is 
being observed, he/she is not being observed by merely one observer but rather by the 
full Israeli Security apparatus. In other words, Motobridge unites all gazes into one 
mega-gaze.  
The gaze’s normalizing judgment is quite peculiar in the arrangement where a 
perimeter is surveilled to detect intrusions, the norm is that either the perimeter is 
empty or friendly subjects are in the perimeter, non-friendly subjects alarm the system 
and sovereign power is summoned to neutralize the threat. The examination technique 
on the other hand is not utilized in the disciplinary apparatus of surveillance systems.    
The above modest analysis of surveillance and security systems installed at 
settlements, thus demonstrates that disciplinary power permeates through settlements 
providing a regulatory function with regards to the Palestinian population. While it is 
true that the scope of that discipline is limited to the areas around the settlements, it is 
significant given that settlements control a giant 42% of total West Bank territory. For 
this reason, the limitations on the scope of settlements’ disciplinary effects cannot be 
discounted. Settlements thus perform a regulatory function by virtue of its ties to the 
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Palestinian economy and by virtue of its surveillance and security systems’ 
disciplinary effect across a vast portion of the West Bank’s land. 
Next to its regulatory functions, settlements perform a dispowering function 
with respect to the Palestinian Authority. For starters, settlements and outposts are 
built on Palestinian land; lands that belong to a population the control of which are the 
object of the PA’s bio-power. The settlement expansion program confiscates lands 
and places them under the IDF’s protection. This implies that 42% of West Bank’s 
territory is impossible to regulate by the PA. The PA’s urban planning schemes are 
nullified by the possibility that a settlement or an outpost might be erected creating an 
uncontrollable territory and a security perimeter around it that effectively makes areas 
adjacent to the settlements inhabitable. The PA as a bio-power apparatus can thus 
neither impose its sovereignty nor utilize bio-political technologies of geo-
surveillance to regulate Palestinian life. In short, settlements dispower the PA. 
Settlements and their security perimeters is not the only PA dispowering 
aspects of their presence, the bypass roads network too, augments and magnifies that 
dispowering effect. The bypass roads network is a network of roads that connects 
Israeli settlements with each other and Israel so that settlers can avoid Palestinian 
villages and enclaves. The network is erratically carved through the West Bank’s 
territory, demolishing and confiscating lands in its way and creating enclaves.87 
Moreover, only Jewish Israeli settlers are allowed to use the network’s roads. In other 
words, it is an exclusively Israeli infrastructure built on top of and carving through the 
Palestinians’ already primitive infrastructure.88 The network clearly performs a 
regulatory function with regards to the settler and Israeli population; however, it 
doesn’t exactly regulate or manage Palestinian life but rather sabotages any PA efforts 
that seek to do so. Circulation management and urban planning for example, become 
very difficult if not impossible when huge chunks of the territory you are trying to 
manage are suddenly beyond your control or when roads are erratically built and you 
are banned from even accessing them let alone managing them. The PA is thus 
dispowered by settlements and settlements’ bypass road networks. This concludes the 
chapter after having showed the regulatory and dispowering functions of settlements.   
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V. Laws and Policies 
This chapter will first explore the main readings of Foucault’s position with respect to 
the law before analysing Israel’s various uses of the law to intervene in Palestinian 
life in the West Bank. It will rely on primary as well as secondary sources in 
explicating Foucault’s position given the variance of interpretations of his thought.  
A. Law in Foucault: 
Although Foucault never dedicated any of his works explicitly for the law, he did 
discuss the subject intermittently throughout his lifetime and across many of his 
works. Currently, there are multiple readings of Foucault’s position on the law. The 
subtle distinctions between each reading and the next are too dense to be discussed 
here; however, two main interpretations stand out for their noticeable opposition. The 
first, and in my opinion misled, understanding of the law in Foucault was expounded 
by Hunt and Wickham. This interpretation understands, what was dubbed by Golder 
and Fitzpatrick as the expulsion thesis, as the core of Foucault’s position on law.89 
The expulsion thesis is an understanding of Foucault that claims that law has been 
expelled from its ancient role of organizing society with the advent of modernity as 
the burgeoning of disciplinary and bio-power displaced sovereign power.90  
As discussed in the section explaining the sovereign mode of power, the 
juridical model of power predominated the west. Subjects where physically and 
publicly punished when they transgressed over the sovereign will. The sovereign will 
was synonymous with the law and the predominant mode of power during that epoch 
was sovereign power. Hunt and Wickham’s expulsion thesis reads Foucault as 
considering the law as the sovereign will and they thus understand the displacement 
of sovereign power by disciplinary power as the displacement of sovereign will and 
the law.91 To put it simpler, they believe that since Foucault understood the law as 
tied with sovereign power, then his finding of sovereign power to have become 
empirically marginal in favour of disciplinary power, and his observing of the 
dispersion of the locus of power from a unitary sovereign to a multiplicity of sites, is a 
marginalizing of the rule of law or in other words, its obsoleteness and expulsion.  
Under Hunt and Wickham’s interpretation, Foucault then had a particular 
conception of what the law is and how it operates regardless of context.92 The law for 
Foucault was thus a mere formulae “Law=rules + sanctions” laid down by the 
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sovereign that exemplified the sovereign’s authority.93 This interpretation, however, 
was widely rejected by many Foucault experts such as Golder, Fitzpatrick and Tadros 
amongst others. While their readings of Foucault differ, they largely agree that Hunt 
and Wickham’s reading was misled. More importantly, they reject the idea that 
Foucault had one particular conception of law and rather believe that Foucault saw the 
law’s role as evolving throughout different times.94 Ironically, Hunt critiqued 
Foucault for disregarding the various roles that law plays in modern society.95  
For Tadros for instance, the expulsion thesis is accurate only to the extent that 
Foucault thinks the law in its old form has largely declined but that, in Tadros’ view, 
does not entail that law per se has been expelled or declined but rather changed its 
character and took on a new form under modernity.96 In fact, Foucault makes it clear 
on many occasions that his understanding of law is very contextual and that the law’s 
role changed overtime. For example, in Introduction to the first volume of his History 
of Sexuality, Foucault discusses the regression of the juridical model, as the expulsion 
thesis likes to point out. He, however, declares the following:  
I do not mean to say that the law fades into the background or that the 
institutions of justice tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more 
and more as a norm, and that the judicial institution is increasingly 
incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so 
on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory.97  
Here, not only does Foucault explicitly reject the expulsion thesis, he also asserts that 
the modus operandi of the law has changed. With the advent of modernity, the law 
has increasingly incorporated and integrated itself as an arm of bio-power acting in a 
regulating and norm-setting manner rather than as a boundary setting oppressive 
manner. The power modus underlying the law’s operation shifted from being a 
manifestation of sovereign power to that of bio-power, regulating populations through 
the various modern state apparatuses and the economy. Tadros is a strong proponent 
of this interpretation of Foucault. He writes: 
Law, in my understanding operates as a field through which techniques of 
governance can intervene in the disciplinary network. Law, then, acts as an 
interface through which governmental decisions can take effect by adjusting 
the operations and arrangements of the disciplinary mechanisms.98  
As Tadros explained, Foucault understood the law as married to sovereignty only in 
the context of the pre-modern ages. The law then divorced itself from sovereignty and 
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tied itself to bio-power. The quantity of legislation increased in the modern age but it 
was used to regulate and alter the behavior of populations rather than just describe a 
threshold of transgression and prescribe physical punishments.99 The law today is not 
limited to criminal law and criminal law itself has fallen under the spell of 
disciplinary mechanisms. Law today is rather largely used as a bio-political technique 
that interferes in the dispositions of the disciplinary mechanisms. In his lectures on 
governmentality Foucault asserts  
It is a question not of imposing laws on men, but of disposing of things: that is 
to say of employing tactics rather than laws, and even of using laws 
themselves as tactics-to arrange things in such a way that, through a certain 
number of means, such and such ends may be achieved.100    
Here Foucault was discussing how new political technologies target populations and 
alter their behavior and uses the disciplinary apparatuses and mechanisms as the arms 
of bio-power in its governance. The law is one political technology that is now used 
for this purpose. 
To conclude this section, I will summarize the main points explicated in it. I 
have looked at two readings of Foucault with regards to his position on the law. I have 
first explored the expulsion thesis, developed by Hunt and Wickham, which claimed 
that Foucault holds a rigid particular conception of the law. That conception, for Hunt 
and Wickham, is almost synonymous with sovereign power and as such, the law has 
become obsolete with displacement of sovereign power by disciplinary power. I then 
explored another, and clearly better, reading of Foucault that understands him as 
seeing law as changing roles and purposes throughout the time. This second 
interpretation, developed by Tadros amongst others, is more comprehensive and 
coherent with Foucault’s works. It understands Foucault’s law as not having a single 
particular conception. While it used to be tied to sovereign power and defined 
transgression thresholds and sanctions in the classical age, it has evolved under 
modernity to largely become a technique or tactic of bio-power that is employed to 
regulate and adjust the behavior of populations by interfering in the arrangement of 
the disciplinary mechanisms. Throughout all the following sections of this paper, 
Tadros’s reading of Foucault will be utilized in the analysis rather than Hunt and 
Wickham’s for its comprehensive nature. The Law, for the purpose of this essay, thus 
could be understood in either modus operandi: tied to sovereign power or to bio-
power.   
This chapter will highlight the ways in which Israel uses the law and 
procedural policies as a bio-political technology to interfere in the dispositions of the 
disciplinary mechanisms that regulate the Palestinian population. The chapter will 
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also illustrate how these policies dispower the PA from governing their population. 
 
B. Closure Policy: 
As previously mentioned the law under modernity has transformed from its role of 
representing the sovereign will to becoming a technique or tactic of bio-power. In its 
modern form, law takes multiple shapes ranging from its addressing of crime to its 
addressing of procedures and regulations. Israel’s closure policy is an instant were 
law has been used as a procedural strategy aimed towards regulating a population by 
manipulating the disposition of checkpoints as well as the permit system and their 
relation to Palestinian subjects. By population, I am not referring to the sum of all 
individuals living in the West Bank. I will rather use the term population to refer to 
groups who have their own behavioural patterns that are measurable statistically and 
targeted for bio-political control. A fixed group of individuals could be viewed as 
many populations at once. For example, the Palestinian population, in the common 
usage of the term, will be viewable as both, a labour population with unemployment 
rates, average incomes, and a patient population with mortality rates and birth rates 
and so on.   
 
         In the years prior to the very intense restrictions on movement, the WBGS has 
witnessed a growth in its labor force despite the incapability of the economy to realize 
such an increase, making the issue of the lack of economic development in the WBGS 
a central factor in determining labor migration. Since 1976, and up until the signing of 
the first Oslo Accords, the Palestinian labor force more than doubled in number, 
however local employment in the WBGS grew by only a third.101 The lack of the 
closure policy at the time gave the Palestinian labour population access to 
employment in Israel, which was responsible for keeping unemployment in the 
WBGS at less than seven percent. This caused the WBGS’s labour population to 
depend on Israel’s larger economy. Consequently, even though the GDP per capita 
was on the increase, the conditions of growth and employment in the West Bank were 
not enhanced and the national productive potential diminished.102    
In March 1993, Israel implemented a full closure policy restricting movement 
between Israel, East Jerusalem, the Gaza strip and the West Bank. The origin of this 
policy stems all the way back to 1967 and it is the evolution of this policy as well as 
its instances that demonstrates Israel’s use of law as a bio-political technology 
towards regulating Palestinian life.  
In the aftermath of the 1967 six day war, Israel issued military orders 
proclaiming the West Bank and Gaza as closed military areas. These orders made the 
West Bank’s citizenry into subjects of military law. In 1972, the first signs of the 
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closure policy began to emerge as general exit permits were issued allowing 
Palestinians to move freely between Israel and the occupied territories but not to stay 
in Israel or East Jerusalem between 1:00 AM and 5:00 AM.103  
In 1991, Israel started amending its policy. It revoked the 1972 general exit 
permits and issued personal exit permits in its stead. This policy change allowed the 
individualization of the permit granting process, giving Israel the ability to restrict the 
movement of unwanted individuals. Permits were not granted to former prisoners and 
detainees and any personnel whose backgrounds might be considered threatening. The 
new system effectively divided the Occupied Territories in to three areas, where 
movement between them was now regulated by the Israeli Military. Movement 
between the West Bank and Gaza, West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the West 
Bank’s northern and southern areas became restricted and regulated. The regulation 
coupled with the granting of individual personal permits gave Israel the ability to use 
these technologies to differentiate between good and bad circulation and to utilize a 
primitive form of geo-surveillance for the first time.104  
In 1993, the closure policy evolved to its final form. Israel began erecting 
checkpoints along the green line, between East Jerusalem and the West Bank and 
within the West Bank itself in order to implement the policy.105 The disciplinary 
effects of, and the state of the art geo-surveillance technologies present at, these 
closure-imposing checkpoints have already been reviewed and analysed in this 
essay’s chapter on checkpoints. One can easily recognize how the Basel System 
fortified the effectiveness and the individualization of the closure policy. The system 
optimizes the Israeli checkpoints’ effective management of circulation on Palestinian 
lands. The system gathers, processes, classifies and analyses data about the 
Palestinian population and allows Israel, through the use of its checkpoints to separate 
good circulation from bad. Palestinians whose information is gathered and kept by the 
system are viewable as legal subjects, health subjects and economic subjects since the 
Basel system has their criminal, health and employment backgrounds on it. Through 
the ability to separate between the good and the bad, West Bank Palestinians as a 
patient, criminal and labour populations are regulated through first, the manipulation 
of their employment rates and income levels by determining their access to 
employment, second through manipulating mortality and birth rates by determining 
their access to health services and crime rates and third through determining the 
frequency of their arrests and detainments by the checkpoints’ security guards. 
Israel’s use of the closure policy as a regulatory mechanism can further be 
evidenced by the variation in the intensity of the restrictions on movement imposed 
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over the years. Israel altered the intensity of the restrictions for example following the 
Palestinian Aqsa Intifada. Palestinians were almost completely banned from entering 
Israel and from moving between the West Bank and East Jerusalem.106 Furthermore, 
Israel regularly bans movement barring exceptional cases during Israeli Holidays.107 
These regular alterations in the restrictions’ intensity demonstrate Israel’s ability to 
manipulate something it controls which, in this case, is the movement patterns of 
Palestinians. In other words, the ability to tighten and loosen the restrictions at will is 
evidence for control. The object of bio-political knowledge and control here can be a 
number of things ranging from migration rates of the migration population between 
the West Bank and Gaza, West Bank and Jordan, and within the West Bank, to the 
employment rate of the labour population and the population densities of each area.  
The closure policy is thus an example of Israel utilizing the law in its modern 
form as a tactic (closure policy) of adjusting the regulatory activity of checkpoints 
with the objective of controlling circulation in the West Bank and consequently 
administering the employment rates, migration rates, and crime rates among others. It 
is worth noting that the closure policy intensified after or with the birth of the 
Palestinian Authority at the Oslo Accords. Prior to the birth of the PA, Israel was 
officially recognized as being responsible for regulating life in the WBGS. During 
that period, Israel used the law as a bio-political tool for regulation as will be shown 
in the next section.  
C. Pre-Oslo Economic Integration Policy:  
 
The huge dependency of the Palestinian labour population on the Israeli job market in 
the years prior to 1993 was the result of Israel’s employment of several legal and 
economic policies that aimed to integrate the Palestinian economy with the Israeli. As 
Leila Farsakh explains, there are four main policies that caused the WBGS economy 
to integrate into the Israeli one. 
       The first policy was to grant Palestinians access to the Israeli job market. The 
tactic aimed to absorb Palestinian labor rather than to make way for free capital flows 
between the two economies.108 This was one instant where the law was used as 
economic policy to create a Palestinian economic dependency on Israel. In this 
instant, Israel as a bio-political apparatus regulated the Palestinian labour population 
by regulating its own businesses economic behaviour. The average income per capita 
during that period mostly improved up until the strict closure policy came along in 
1993. These structural developments made the Palestinian economy dependent on the 
Israeli labor market, allowing Israel to take in a considerable percentage of labourers 
that resulted in a shift in employment patterns from agriculture to the service and 
construction sector. In other words, the farmers’ population shrunk while the 
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construction population expanded. The law in this case did not operate as sovereign 
will in the manner typical of the Middle-Ages’ sovereigns but rather as a bio-political 
regulatory instrument with the objective of increasing the employment of the 
Palestinian labor population at Israeli businesses.  
Another economic policy was a trade regime imposed on the WBGS that 
further diminished the likelihood of having a growing Palestinian economy. The 
policy determined that the WBGS customs union would be incorporated into Israel’s 
customs union. This was an enforced policy that allowed Israel to restrict the kinds of 
commodities that were to be imported to and exported from the WBGS. It also 
imposed an external tariff structure that was solely determined by Israeli officials, 
leaving trade with other countries to be approved and passed through Israel, with the 
assistance of Israeli agents.109 Here, Israel regulated the circulation of goods at the 
borders of the WBGS by means of utilizing the law as an economic policy that entails 
installing a hierarchy of Israeli officials and agents who are disciplined to differentiate 
between good and bad circulation of goods be it in-flowing or outflowing. This 
control over Palestinian customs and importing/exporting activities acted as a 
mechanism to affect and regulate the wealth of the Palestinians through determining 
their access to international trade and their dietary habits by determining their access 
to imported goods. This is thus another case of the law acting as a bio-political 
technology of control rather than, as sovereign will. 
  
          In addition, an economic management system that was determined by Israel as 
macroeconomic policy played a role in the integration process. An example of this 
imposition includes a monetary union with Israel, with the Israeli currency being the 
trading currency.110 Through unifying the currencies, the Israeli government’s 
regulation of its own monetary policy becomes extended over Palestinian subjects. 
The rate of inflation and consequently, Palestinians’ purchasing power for instance 
became administrable by the Israeli government. An increased purchasing power 
implies an increase in wealth both of which became objects of knowledge and control. 
Here, an economic policy of uniting currencies gave the Bank of Israel a method for 
regulating the Palestinian economy and consequently multiple aspects of Palestinian 
life. By manipulating purchasing power, Israel is able to manipulate the financial 
ability to access health, food and education. This implies an ability to control the rates 
pertaining to each of these fields such as mortality rates and illiteracy rates. Once 
again the law here acted as a bio-political regulatory mechanism rather than a 
punitive, subtractive and sovereign one.   
The high intensity closure implemented in 1993 dealt a heavy blow to the 
Palestinian economy. World Bank estimates Palestinian losses due to total closure in 
August/September 1997 to amount to $4-6 million per day, which is at least $2.8 
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billion in the 1993-1996 periods.111 It altered the economy by prohibiting the 
movement of labor and goods from and to the WBGS. The decreasing movement of 
labor affected unemployment, diminished trade and weakened both the agricultural 
and industrial sectors causing a decline in local production and the geographic 
alienation of the both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip’s populations respectively.112  
Unemployment rates rose to over sixty percent after the 1997 total closure,113 further 
emphasizing the severity of the dependence throughout the previous years and the 
damaging effects of the lengthy checkpoint stops and delays at the borders.114  
The closure was also responsible for an increase in child labor, a growing 
phenomenon that became more visible, placing a negative impact on education and 
the livelihoods of children since the majority was not registered with the Labor 
Office.115 The Israeli usage of the law as a bio-political technique for regulating 
Palestinian life in the West Bank prior to the Oslo negotiations process is clear, what 
is interesting here is how these policies extended beyond the Oslo Accords and were 
in some instances consolidated by it.  
 
D. Oslo Accords: 
The Oslo Accords is another lucid example of Israel’s use of the law as a bio-political 
instrument that both interferes with the Palestinian economy and dispowers the PA. 
From the onset of the Oslo process, Israel was identified as the overriding power in 
the negotiation process and the main determinant of the Palestinian economy. This is 
particularly a feature of the Economic Protocol, which maintained rather than 
improved the structure of occupation.116 Even in the policy parameters of the interim 
period, Israeli military law that entailed restrictions on Palestinian economic activity, 
continued to place the WBGS under “occupational regime”.117 The PA could not 
improve the state of the Palestinian economy since their power to legislate was 
rejected by Israel when signing the second Oslo agreement only a couple of years 
later.118  
A dispowering aspect to the Oslo Accords is its consolidating Israel’s the 
determination of Palestinian trade policies. Israel’s determination of trade policies 
under the customs union consolidated by the Economic Protocol legally bans 
Palestine from establishing trade relations with countries that do not have trade links 
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with Israel, rendering Palestinian trade with most Arab neighbouring countries 
impossible.119 The protocol’s objective was to deepen Palestinian-Israeli ties by 
keeping the territories economically linked to Israel but ended up weakening their 
economic ties with the rest of the world.120 The PLO thus conceded the PA’s right to 
administer the entry and exit of goods in the West Bank by agreeing to the economic 
protocol. This renders the PA permanently incapacitated and dispowered with regards 
to administering an essential part of circulation management, namely the circulation 
of goods as well as wealth.   
The Oslo Accords dispowered the PA even further with regards to the 
distribution of water. For starters, it allotted Israel 80% of the West Bank’s water 
resource and capped the amount of water that the West Bank can ever draw to merely 
118 million cubic centimetres, 80 of which to have been extracted from new wells. 
For the creation of future wells and water resource projects, the agreement established 
the Joint Water Committee. The committee that was initially established to build 
cooperation failed miserably according to a 2013 study by Jan Selby, a British 
researcher.121 Israel regularly vetoes or delays all water projects that would service 
Palestinians while its military implements the projects that would service Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank regardless of whether the PA’s representatives vetoing 
the proposals.  
This here is a staggering demonstration of PA dispowerment. Other than the 
fact that Israel effectively regulates the West Bank’s water supply, legal agreements 
that favour the PA are ignored and show no regulatory effect on the ground.  Even in 
the instances where the joint water committee does approve a PA project, Israeli 
military law requires additional permits to be granted by the military itself before any 
projects are executed in Area C of the West Bank. Once again, a bio-political state 
apparatus should be regulating the circulation of water and the distribution of key 
resources within its territory. Since Israel does the regulatory function for both parties, 
the PA is by default dispowered and the Oslo Accords agreement consolidates that 
dispowerment.    
More than anything, the Oslo Accords dispowers the PA with its geographical 
division or the West Bank. The accords determined that Area A is to be under the 
PA’s full civil and security control and Area B to be under Palestinian civilian control 
and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control while Area C is to be under full Israeli 
civil and security control. This division of security responsibilities dispowers the PA 
by default regarding the management of its people’s lives. Even optimistically 
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assuming an effective security apparatus in area A and B that would at most amount 
to securing 28% of the territory, which is far from enough for a state apparatus to 
effectively regulate its population since 72% of the land is regulated by the Israeli 
Military and the Israeli Civil Administration.122 
 
E. Israeli Labor Law: 
The PA’s dispowerment with regards to regulating the Palestinian economy is 
exemplified by its attempts at reducing the unemployment problem. The PA’s 
attempts at absorbing some of the unemployed labor force mostly involved the 
creation of job opportunities in the public sector under the PA itself. Although this 
effort took in about fifteen percent of the labor force, it was unsuccessful in 
permanently addressing the issue of unemployment.123 Despite the PA’s efforts, 
employment in Israeli settlements has grown and permits to work in settlements 
became easier to obtain since they were more accessible as opposed to working in 
Israel.124 In other words, it was Israel that could alleviate the unemployment problem 
and not the PA. 
16.1% of the West Bank’s entire workforce is employed at Israeli settlements 
or in Israel. As employees of Israeli firms, they fall under Israeli law’s jurisdiction. 
Israeli law was granted jurisdiction in West Bank settlements by military enactments 
number 783 and 892 in the year 1981 and companies operating in the settlements 
were thus made bound by Israeli labor law.125 The applicability of Israeli law to 
Palestinian labourers working at Israeli settlements is a relatively new phenomenon, 
however, considering that the Isreali High Court of Justice settled the matter only in 
2011 in the famous Workers Hotline case. The 2011 court ruling granted Palestinian 
workers that are employed at settlements the same rights that Israeli workers are 
granted under Israeli law. The court’s argument that employers must provide equal 
treatment to all employees did not cause the expected positive effect on Palestinian 
labourers well being since employers reacted by hiring Palestinian companies as 
middle men that subcontract job arrangements with Palestinian labourers.126 By using 
sub-contractors to do the hiring, Companies are not legally bound to provide the 
workers with the same benefits that Israeli workers enjoy. 
This here might be seen at first glance as an example of a failed attempt of 
using the law to regulate a portion of Palestinian labourers. However, the failure to 
implement the law as it is stated by the HCJ can be seen as a tactic of regulation rather 
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than as a sign of sovereign weakness. If law is to be understood as sovereign will and 
this is a case of a law that is not applied then that would imply that the sovereign is 
weak and is unable to impose his will. If however, the law is understood as a tactic of 
regulation, then regulatory function of the law is not necessarily tied to the wording of 
the law or as in this case, the judge’s ruling. The law here can be seen as regulatory 
insofar as it defines how businesses can avoid having to provide equal treatment to 
employees by defining how the courts get to consider Palestinian labourers as part of 
the staff of the Israeli businesses. In other words, by defining the hiring method that 
makes a Palestinian worker be considered an employee of the businesses, the court 
indirectly defined how a business could adjust its hiring methods to avoid the courts’ 
considering of the Palestinian labourers as the business’s employees.           
F. Military Orders and Enactments: 
Israel’s use of the law as a bio-political tactic employed towards managing Palestinian 
life can further be elaborated by its use of military law. Apart from the fact that the 
closure policy itself has its origins in a military order, Israel has used and still uses 
military orders for expropriating lands that are then used for the development of 
settlements, and bypass roads amongst other things all of which have been shown to 
provide both a regulatory and a dispowering function in preceding chapters in this 
essay. 
The state of Israel employed Israeli military orders to confiscate Palestinian 
land under the pretext of military and security reasons for the purpose of building 
settlements during the years between 1968 and 1979. The lands on which the 
settlements of Matitiyahu, Neve Zuf, Rimonim, Bet El, Kokhav, Hashahar, Alon 
Shvut, El'azar, Efrat, Har Gilo, Migdal Oz, Gittit, Yitav and Qiryat Arba were built 
was confiscated using this method127.  
 
            In June 1979, a petition was submitted to the High Court of Justice concerning 
the acquisition on which a settlement with the name of Elon Moreh was to be 
constructed. The HCJ ruled against the pretext of military and security need for the 
first time after intense pressure from two affidavits that were submitted by the 
Palestinian petitioners and the settler group that was supposed to live in Elon Moreh 
upon its construction.128 The two affidavits undermined the argument of military and 
security necessity and the ruling came against the land seizure order that was issued to 
confiscate the land effectively nullifying it.   
 
          Since that case in 1979, the use of military orders that confiscate land under the 
pretext of military necessity with the purpose of building settlements ceased. The use 
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of that legal tool only returned after 1993 as a pretext for building the bypass roads 
network that was discussed in the settlement section of this essay.129   
 
           Israel used military law to confiscate lands by declaring huge areas of land as 
‘state land’. The declaration of land as state land was based on Order No. 59 "Order 
Concerning State Property (Judea & Samaria)" (1967). It established the 'Custodian of 
Government Property' to take control of land owned by the Jordanian Government 
that was occupied in 1967.130After a careful examination of Ottoman and Jordanian 
law, additional areas of land were found eligible for registration as state law. In 
December 1979, following the Elon Moreh case, the Custodian for Government and 
the Civil department of the State Attorney’s Office initiated a double investigation to 
systematically study all land ownership records and all areas of cultivation to 
determine which areas of land would have been eligible for seizure by the Jordanian 
custodian under Ottoman and Jordanian law. Studying land cultivation activities was 
important since Jordanian law allowed the Jordanian state at the time to declare land 
that was not farmed for at least three consecutive years, or land that had not been 
farmed for three years or land that is at a big distance from all villages as state land. 
26% of all West Bank land was deemed to fall under this category and was 
consequentially declared state land.131 Once the declaration was made, those liable to 
be injured had to file for appeal to an Israeli military committee within 45 days of the 
declaration or else permanently lose the right to appeal.132  
  
             Israel seized Palestinian lands by means of military law also by issuing the 
Order Regarding Absentee property. The order entails that any private lands whose 
owner departed from the West Bank, before during or after the 1967 war, was 
declared ‘abandoned property’.133 Abandoned property becomes trusted by the Israeli 
custodian who is then obliged to protect the land and to save any profits accrued from 
its management until the owner returns. Given that Israel banned the return of 
Palestinian refugees, the Custodian very rarely had to return lands that were declared 
abandoned to their owners. Also, if a piece of land was unrightfully declared 
abandoned, owners had 45 days to appeal the declaration before the military 
committee or the property is forever lost.134 
 
             The final method of land expropriation using the law is to expropriate it for 
public needs. Jordanian law allowed Jordanian public bodies to expropriate private 
land by publishing its intent in the official gazette, where in the absence of appeals for 
a period of 15 days after notifying the owner, the Ministerial Council decides whether 
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the intent is in line with public interests. Israel amended this law by means of military 
orders to transfer the authority of the ministerial council to the Israeli Civil 
Administration and abolished the requirement of publishing the intended 
expropriation in the official paper. The military order also transferred the power of 
local courts to review petitions to the Israeli Military Appeals Committee. 
Expropriated land became legal possessions of the Custodian for Government and 
Abandoned Property. This method was used by Israel primarily for the construction of 
the previously discussed bypass roads network serving the settlements.135  
 
             This section has thus far briefly overviewed how Israel used military law for 
expropriating Palestinian land. It has not however, explained how this law relates to 
the Foucauldian framework of this essay. At first glance, the expropriation appears as 
a manifestation of sovereign power since the activity of seizing lands has been of a 
subtractive nature from the Palestinian perspective. This, however, is misleading since 
the law under sovereign power defines the lines of transgression and punishes in a 
subtractive and spectacular manner that is not the case here.  
            As explained above, Israel built and amended on already existing laws of 
another fallen sovereign to give itself the right to expropriate Palestinian lands. 
Israel’s large refrainment of using military orders that confiscate land under the 
pretext of military necessity since 1979 in favour of using State Land declarations 
demonstrates that the law is not regarded, as sovereign will. If law were sovereign 
will, then the military necessity method would have sufficed, especially since Israel 
has the military power to back up these confiscations. Moreover, Israel’s finding that 
the methods of state land declarations and abandoned land declarations are better 
alternatives demonstrates the lack of a unitary sovereign and more importantly the 
varying effectiveness of each tactic compared to the next one. In other words, the fact 
that Israel had to manipulate and alter old laws of another sovereign to make their 
land confiscation schemes appear lawful demonstrates that the law in all these 
instances was used as a bio-political technology of managing the distribution of land, 
the construction of settlements and bypass roads all of which serve a regulatory and a 
dispowering function as has been emphasized in earlier chapters of this essay. 
Military law is thus, like any law under bio-power, by itself neither regulatory nor 
dispowering but it rather employs other bio-political technologies of control to 
perform both regulatory and dispowering functions.      
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VI. Conclusion: 
  
Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1993 following the Oslo 
Accords, Israel supposedly handed its duties of safeguarding the economic and social 
interests of the West Bank’s Palestinian population to the Palestinian Authority. It 
doing so, it allegedly followed a separation strategy and allowed the Palestinian 
people to govern themselves. This essay has applied Foucault’s ideas on power and 
governmentality to the Israeli mechanisms of intervention in Palestinian life in the 
West Bank to reveal that Israel continues to regulate and govern Palestinian life in the 
West Bank and at the same time dispower the PA.  
With respect to the argument pertaining to Israel’s continued regulation of 
Palestinian life in the Westbank, Flying checkpoints were found to perform a 
regulatory function at the individual level with respect to its acting as disciplinary 
institutions that can appear anywhere within the West Bank by virtue of its random 
placement nature. Moreover, both types of checkpoints were found to act as bio-
political instruments that manage circulation in the Westbank and thus perform a 
regulatory function at the population level. As the second object of analysis, 
Settlements were found to perform a regulatory function at the individual level by 
virtue of their acting as discontinuous disciplinary institutions across a large 
landscape of lands and bypass roads while they performed a regulatory function at the 
population level by virtue of its employment of a sizable 16.1% of the Palestinian 
labor force. As the third object of analysis, the law was found to perform a regulatory 
function by acting as a bio-political instrument that organizes the disposition of 
checkpoints, settlement and settler roads, trade relations and the distribution of water 
resources.  
With respect to the argument pertaining to the structure of the occupation 
dispowering the PA, checkpoints and settlements were found to incapacitate the PA 
when it comes to circulation management. The presence of checkpoints, settlements 
and settlements’ bypass road networks makes the PA’s management of the West 
Bank’s circulation, impossible. The law was found to serve the PA’s dispowerment, 
by its ordering of the checkpoints through the closure policy, its ordering of 
settlements and settler roads through its land confiscation mechanism as well as by its 
consolidating of the pre-Oslo occupation’s structure.  
Taking the findings of all the performed analysis combined, this essay can 
demonstrably conclude that the PA is incapable of managing the Palestinian 
population of the West Bank since it is almost completely dispowered. Israel, despite 
the alleged separation strategy, continues to be the regulatory bio-power apparatus in 
the West Bank.	  The PA was born dispowered out of the Oslo Accords and Israel’s use 
of bio-political technologies diminishes, if not eliminates, the conditions for the 
possibility for the emerging state apparatus of the PA to ever develop into a modern 
bio-political apparatus.           
